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first sold to investors via an Initial Coin Offering (ICO) and then traded on a frictionless
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probability that the developer sells all his tokens on the market and, as a consequence, no
development occurs. Anticipating this, the developer will hold the ICO only when his own
funds are insufficient to sustain the development of the software. The equilibrium of the
game is, in general, inefficient.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies a new mechanism to finance innovation: seignorage. Seignor-
age allows the developer of a blockchain-based open-source software to rip a direct
financial benefit (in addition to indirect benefits derived from, for example, career
concerns)via the creation of a token—itself a piece of open-source software—that
must be used in conjunction with the software.
Historically, seigniorage are profits earned by a government by issuing a currency.
As the economic activity within a country increases, the value of the currency used
in this country also increases, and with it the profit earned by the government issuing
this currency. The same mechanism allows developers of open-source blockchain-
based projects to benefit from their work. As an illustration, consider a population
of agents who wishes to exchange either a good or a service, but are prevented from
doing so for lack of the required infrastructure. If this exchange can occur in elec-
tronic form, then the missing infrastructure may be a protocol, that is, the technical
specifications governing the communication between machines. A developer may
create the missing protocol, and profit from his innovation by simultaneously creat-
ing a token and establishing that all exchanges occurring using the protocol must
use this token.1 The developer owns the initial stock of tokens. It follows that, if
the developer can credibly commit to a specific supply of tokens and the protocol
is successful, then there will be a positive demand for tokens, a positive price for
tokens, and positive profits earned by the developer.
Bolockchain enables this mechanism in three ways (see the next subsection for
additional details on blockchain). It allows the developer to commit to a specific
supply of tokens. Absent this commitment, because the marginal cost of creating
electronic tokens is zero, the only possible equilibrium price for tokens is zero, leading
to zero profits for the entrepreneur. Using blockchain technology, instead, the rules
determining whether (and how) the supply of tokens increases over time can be
fully specified initially within the software. If the software is open source, this
commitment is credible because anybody can verify the software’s source code.2
1 Prices could be expressed in fiat currency (that is, in some numeraire). The important thing
is that they need to be settled using the token.
2 Conversely, it is not possible to finance the development of a closed-source protocol via seignor-
age, because it is not possible to verify the rules determining the supply of tokens. Of course, it is
possible to finance the development of a closed source protocol via a set of fees/prices (see Section
5.1 for a discussion).
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Furthermore, blockchain can be used to specify that only a given token can be
used to transact using the protocol.3 Finally, blockchain may be used to create the
protocol.
This paper is the first to study the ability of seignorage to generate incentives
for innovation. I build a model in which, in every period, a developer exerts effort
and invests in the development of a protocol. Initially, the developer owns the entire
stock of tokens, and can sell some to investors via an Initial Coin Offering (ICO),
modeled as an auction. Subsequently, in every period he can sell or buy tokens on a
frictionless market for tokens, in which both users of the protocol and investors are
active. The developer can use the proceedings of the sale of tokens to either invest
in the development of the protocol or to consume.
The main insight is that, if investors are price takers, then in any post-ICO period
there is an anti-coordination problem. If investors expect the developer to develop
the software in the future, this expectation should be priced into the token’s current
price. But if this is the case, then the developer is strictly better off by selling
all his tokens, which allows him to “cash in” on the future development without
doing any. On the other hand, if investors expect no development to occur, the
price of the token will be low. The developer should hold on as many tokens as
possible, exert effort and invest in the development of the protocol so to increase
the future price of the token. In every post-ICO period, therefore, the equilibrium
is in mixed strategy: the price of the token is such that the developer is indifferent
between selling all his tokens (and therefore stop developing the protocol) or keeping
a strictly positive amount of tokens (and therefore continuing the development of
the protocol). The developer randomizes between these two options, in a way that
leaves investors indifferent between purchasing tokens in any given period.
The equilibrium at ICO is instead in pure strategies. The important point is
that, if the ICO is an auction, then the share of the total supply of tokens sold
by the developer is announced initially. Because the incentives to exert effort and
invest in the development of the software increase with the share of tokens held by
the developer, investors can anticipate the amount of development that will occur
in the period following the ICO, which will be reflected in the price of the token at
ICO.
In addition, both at ICO and post-ICO there may be a coordination problem.
3 Of course, it is always possible to modify the source code to accept a different token, therefore
creating a “fork”: a new protocol, with its own development, incompatible with the initial protocol.
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Because of a cash constraint, in every period the developer cannot invest in the
development of the software more than his assets. It follows that the developer
may sell some of his tokens, as a way to accumulate assets and finance the future
development of the software. The number of tokens that the developer needs to
sell in order to finance future investments depends on the current price for tokens,
therefore generating a coordination problem. If the price is high, the developer
needs to sell few tokens and his incentives to invest and develop the software in the
future are high. This, in turn, justifies the high price for tokens today. If instead
the price today is low, in order to finance future development the developer needs
to sell many tokens. But then his incentives to develop the software will be low,
which justifies the fact that the price is low today. Therefore at ICO there could
be multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria, while post ICO there could be multiple
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.4
When choosing whether and when to hold an ICO the developer is therefore
facing a tradeoff. If he holds an ICO, in every subsequent periods with positive
probability he will sell all his tokens and not develop the software. Postponing
the ICO therefore prevents the creation of a market for tokens and works as a
commitment device, because the developer will hold all his tokens for sure and set
the corresponding level of effort and investment. On the other hand, if the developer
does not sell tokens at ICO he may lack the funds to invest in the development of
the protocol. As a consequence, the developer never wants to hold an ICO if his own
assets are sufficient to finance the optimum level of investment in the development
of the protocol, but may hold the ICO as soon as his own funds are not sufficient to
achieve the optimal level of investment.
The equilibrium of the game is, in general, not efficient. The first source of in-
efficiency is that, as already discussed, the developer may need to sell some tokens
to finance the investment in the development of the protocol, but doing so implies
that in every subsequent period he will develop the protocol with probability less
then one. But even assuming that the developer has sufficient funds to invest opti-
mally, there is a second, more subtle, source of inefficiency. The developer’s level of
4 Clearly, if there are network effects, then there is an additional coordination problem: for given
sequence of effort and investment by the developer, there is a coordination problem among users,
possibly leading to the existence of a “high adoption” and “low adoption” equilibria. The novelty
here is that fixing one of the adoption equilibria, there are multiple equilibrium sequence of effort
and investment arising from a coordination problem between investors and the developer.
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effort and investment are set so to maximize the value of his stock of tokens. This
value depends on the volume of the transaction occurring using the protocol during
a given period of time.5 In the first best, instead, effort and investment should be
set so to maximize the present discounted value of the surplus generated by the
protocol. That is, the fact that the protocol will be used and generate surplus over
multiple periods is completely disregarded by the developer who, therefore, will set
an inefficient level of effort and investment.
1.1 Blockchain-based protocols
The key premise of this paper is that blockchain can be the technological foundation
of various other protocols. To illustrate this fact, it is useful to make an analogy
between Blockchain and the Internet Protocol Suite.
The Internet protocol suite (commonly known as TCP/IP) was developed in the
late ’60 and early ’70 to allow for the decentralized transmission of data, that is,
transmission of data via a network of computers in which no node is, individually,
essential to the well functioning of the network. It was financed by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), with the goal of increasing military
communication resilience by moving from a hub-and-spoke model of communication
to a complete (or mesh) network model of communication (see Figure 1).6 The
Internet Protocol Suite is the technological foundation of a second set of protocols,
also called application layer protocols. Those protocols make use of TCP/IP to
handle specific types of data in specific context: HTTP for accessing web pages;
SMTP, POP, and IMAP for sending and receiving emails; FTP for sending receiving
files; and so on.
Blockchain further expands the possible operations that can be performed by
a network of computer in which no node is essential. Like TCP/IP, it allows for
the decentralised transmission of data, but also permits the decentralised storage,
verification and manipulation of data.7 Blockchain is also similar to TCP/IP in that
5 This will result from an application of the equation of exchange, usually employed to link a
country’s price level, real GDP, money supply and velocity of money.
6 See Hafner and Lyon (1998), in particular the description of the work of Paul Baran (pp 53-64).
7 Sometimes a distinction is made between blockchain and decentralized ledger technologies,
where blockchain refers to a specific way to maintain a decentralized ledger. This distinction is
not relevant for the purpose of this paper. Another distinction is between “blockchain” meaning
the technology, and “the blockchain” meaning a specific application of the blockchain technology,
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Fig. 1: Hub-and-spoke (left) and mesh (right)
it provides the foundation for a number of other protocols. The most well-known
is the Bitcoin protocol: a protocol allowing a network of computers to store data
(how many Bitcoin each address owns) and to enforce specific rules regarding how
these data can be manipulated (no double spending). The Bitcoin protocol is not
only the oldest and most famous application of blockchain technology, but also well
illustrates an important point: absent blockchain technology, the same type of data
can be maintained only within a traditional organization (typically a bank).
Numerous other open-source blockchain-based protocols currently exist or are
being actively developed. In addition to several cryptocurrencies (such as Monero,
ZCash, Litecoin), there are protocols for building decentralized computing plat-
forms that can run applications on a network rather than on specific computers
(see Ethereum, EOS, Cardano, NEO); protocols for decentralized real-time gross
settlement (see Ripple, Stellar); protocols enabling the creation of decentralized
marketplaces for storage and hosting of files (see SIA, Filecoin, Storj), for renting
in/out CPU cycles (see Golem), for event or concert tickets (see Aventus), for ebooks
(see Publica); protocol for generic e-commerce transactions (see Openbazaar); pro-
tocols creating fully decentralized prediction markets (see Augur, Gnosis), financial
exchanges (see 0xproject), and financial derivatives (see MakerDAO); protocols al-
lowing the existence of fully decentralized organizations (see Aragon) and virtual
worlds (see Decentraland); and many more.8
usually the Bitcoin blockchain.
8 To my knowledge, the only well established blockchain projects that are not open source
protocols or are not planning to open-source their code are Iota (a protocol that is not fully open
source), and Binance Coin (a token that works as a “voucher” to access Binance, a traditional
exchange).
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1.2 Blockchain and Seignorage
An important difference between the protocols built on TCP/IP and those built on
blockchain is the way in which their developers are rewarded. The vast majority of
protocols based on TCP/IP are opensource, free to adopt and use. The contributors
to these projects are not organized in a single, traditional company, but rather form a
loosely-defined group around one (or multiple) project leader and are based on open
collaboration (as typical of open source projects). They do not receive immediate,
direct financial compensation for their contributions, and are motivated by career
concerns (i.e. increase their reputation and reap a financial benefit in the future)
and by non-monetary considerations (i.e. the pleasure of sharing, collaborating,
contributing to a public good).
Instead, as already discussed in the introduction, the development of blockchain-
based protocols can leverage financial incentives via seignorage. This is possible
whenever the protocol must be used in conjunction with a token. In case of protocols
creating decentralized marketplaces, the token is typically the currency used by the
two sides of the market. In blockchain projects without this “marketplace” element,
the use of the token can vary. For example, in case of cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin there are two sides: people who need to exchange bitcoins, and those who use
their computers to process these transactions, also called miners. Users of bitcoins
“pay” the miners in two ways. One is direct: the sender of bitcoins can pay a fee
to process the transaction faster, and this fee is earned by the miner. The second
is indirect: the network awards miners new bitcoins for their work. Because of its
effect on the price, this increase in the supply of bitcoins amounts to a transfers
from the holders of bitcoins to the miners.9 A similar mechanism is used within
decentralized computing platforms such as Ethereum.
The most visible part of seignorage is the Initial Coin Offering (ICO), where the
developer sells tokens to investors and users for the first time. The first notable
ICO was that of Ethereum in 2014, raising USD 2.3 million in approximately 12
hours. In a recent report PwC estimates that in 2017 there were 552 ICOs raising a
total of USD 7 million.10 The same report notes that the figures for 2018 are likely
9 See also Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017). The case of Bitcoin also illustrates another
point: that the mechanism by which one side of the market rewards the other may not be a market-
clearing price. This aspect, however, will not be relevant here.
10 See https://cryptovalley.swiss/wp-content/uploads/20180628_PwC-S-CVA-ICO-Report_
EN.pdf
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to be much larger: just in the first half of 2018 there were 537 ICOs raising more
than USD 13 million. Interestingly, some analysts claim that about half of the ICOs
launched in 2017 already failed by early 2018.11
The less visible part of seignorage is the sale on the open market of tokens
that were not sold at ICO. Very few projects disclose whether and to what extent
they finance themselves this way.12 Some projects refer to this practice within
blog posts and informal communication.13 More visible is the practice of rewarding
suppliers using tokens. This is often referred to as “bug bounty programs” by which
translators, coders, marketers receive tokens for their work.
Despite this difference in visibility, a recent work by Howell, Niessner, and Yer-
mack (2018) show that two sides of seignorage—sale of tokens at ICO and sale of
tokens post-ICO—are comparable in terms of number of tokens sold (or expected
to be sold). They analyze a sample of around 400 ICOs and find that, on average,
only 54 percent of the tokens are sold at ICOs. Interestingly, they also find that
only about 1/3 of ICOs include vesting provisions locking up the tokens not sold at
ICO (or part of them) for some amount of time.
1.3 Relevant literature.
This paper contributes to the literature on innovation and incentives, in particular to
the literature studying the motivation behind contributions to open source software
(see the seminal paper by Lerner and Tirole, 2002). With this respect, I show that
open source—with its organizational structure and ethos—can coexist with strong
financial incentives. Of course, an open question that I do not address here is
whether financial rewards will crowd out other motives (see, for example, Benabou
and Tirole, 2003), that is, whether the open source ethos will be compromised by
the introduction of strong financial incentives.
Closely related is a recent literature building theoretical models of ICOs (see
Sockin and Xiong, 2018, Li and Mann, 2018, Catalini and Gans, 2018). The main
difference is that, in my model, the developer can sell tokens both at ICO and post
ICO. That is, these papers focus on a specific aspect of seignorage, the ICO, while
11 See http://fortune.com/2018/02/25/cryptocurrency-ico-collapse/.
12 Ripple is an exception as it announces in advance a schedule for selling parts of its XRP stock,
see https://ripple.com/insights/q1-2018-xrp-markets-report/.
13 For example, see this blog post by the Ethereum foundation https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/
01/07/2394/.
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my goal is to capture it in its entirety. Of course, the flip side is that these models
provide a more realistic and detailed description of how ICOs work, while here I
simply assume that an ICO is an auction. A second important difference is that
here the quality of the project is endogenous, which allows me to study the incentives
for innovation generated by ICOs and seignorage more in general.
There is a small but growing literature studying how blockchain works (see, for
example Catalini and Gans, 2016, Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi, 2017, Dimitri,
2017, Prat and Walter, 2018, Ma, Gans, and Tourky, 2018, Budish, 2018). Within
this literature, closely related is Biais, Bisiere, Bouvard, and Casamatta (2018),
in which the price of a token and incentives of miners (i.e., the computers that
process transactions and therefore constitute the nodes of the bitcoin blockchain)
are determined in the equilibrium of a game-theoretic model. Also in my paper prices
and incentives are determined in equilibrium, but the interest is in the incentives to
develop the software rather than processing transactions. The portion of the model
that determines the equilibrium price of the token borrows heavily from Athey,
Parashkevov, Sarukkai, and Xia (2017), who propose an equilibrium model of the
price of bitcoin in which the demand comes both from users and from investors. The
novelty with respect to their paper is that, here, the demand for tokens (originating
from both investors and users) is a function of the developer’s effort and investment,
while the “quality” of the bitcoin protocol is taken as given in their model.
Gans and Halaburda (2015) study platform based digital currencies such as Face-
book credits and Amazon coins. These currencies share some similarities with the
tokens discussed in the introduction, because they can be used to perform exchanges
on a specific platform. They are, however, controlled by their respective platforms,
which decide on their supply and the extent to which they can be traded or ex-
changed. This may explain why, despite some initial concerns,14 these currencies
neither gained wide adoption, nor generated significant profits for the platform is-
suing them.
A line of literature that is also related is the one studying how the financial
market may weaken incentive schemes faced by managers (see, for example, the
14 See, for example “Could a gigantic nonsovereign like Facebook someday launch a real currency
to compete with the dollar, euro, yen and the like?” by Matthew Yglesias on Slate, February 29,
2012 (available at http://www.slate.com/articles/business/cashless_society/2012/02/facebook_
credits_how_the_social_network_s_currency_could_compete_with_dollars_and_euros_
.html).
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seminal work by Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982 and the most recent Bisin, Gottardi,
and Rampini, 2008, Acharya and Bisin, 2009). The reason is that, also in my model,
the possibility of trading on the financial market reduces the incentives to exert effort
and invest. The environment I’m considering here is however different from the one
in these papers, because there is no contract between the issuer of the currency (the
developer) and those holding the currency (the investors). The developer’s incentive
problem depends on how the equilibrium price of the token is determined and how
this price is affected by the developer’s actions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model
of seignorage. Section 3 solves for its equilibrium. Section 4 illustrates the first
best of the model and compares it to its equilibrium. Section 5 discusses some
extensions to the model. Section 6 concludes. Unless otherwise noted, all proofs
and mathematical derivations missing from the text are in appendix.
2 The model
The economy is composed of a developer, a large mass of risk-neutral price-taking
investors, and a large mass of users. At the beginning of every period 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the
developer exerts effort et and invests it into the development of a Blockchain-based
protocol, which can be used by users to transact with each other. The development
of the protocol lasts T periods, after which the developer exists the game and the
protocol continues being used indefinitely. At the beginning of the game, the devel-
oper establishes that all transactions using the protocol must be conducted using a
specific token, with total supply M , fully owned by the developer.
In period to ≤ T , the developer sells some tokens to investors via an auction.
This stage is the ICO (Initial Coin Offering) stage, and its date to is chosen by
the developer.15 In each period t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}, first the developer exerts effort
and invests, then a frictionless market for tokens opens, and then users can use the
protocol. In every period after the developer exits (that is, in every t > T ), first
15 As we will see, in solving for the equilibrium, the important element of an auction will be that
the developer specifies in advance what share of the total stock of tokens will be sold and what
share will be kept by the developer. Hence, despite the fact that not all ICOs are auctions (see, for
example, the practice of holding uncapped ICOs in which the token’s price is fixed and the number
of tokens sold is determined in equilibrium), the results derived in this paper extend to other types
of ICOs as long as these shares are specified in advance.
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the market for tokens opens, and then users use the protocol. See Figure 2 for a
graphical representation of the timeline.
1 ≤ t < to (pre ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
t = to (ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Auction for tokens
to < t ≤ T (post ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Market for tokens opens
Users use the protocol
the developer exits in period T
t = T + 1
t+ 1
Market for tokens opens
Users use the protocol
Fig. 2: Timeline
Investors. Investors are risk-neutral profit maximizers with no cash constraints.
They can purchase tokens in every period and sell them during any subsequence
period. Importantly, when buying or selling tokens on the market they are price
takers: their net demand for tokens in period t depends on the sequence of token’s
prices from period t onward, which they take as given. Investors do not discount
the future, and are indifferent between purchasing any amount of tokens in period t
whenever pt = p¯t ≡ maxs>t {E[ps]}, where p¯t is therefore the largest future expected
price. If instead pt > p¯, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period t is zero.
Finally, if pt < p¯ then the investors’ demand for token in period t is not defined.
Users. In every period t ≥ to, there is a market for tokens, on which users can
purchase tokens to be used with the protocol. The total value of all exchanges
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occurring using the protocol during a given period is the value of the protocol and
is defined as:
Vt =
t∑
s=1
f(es, is) (1)
where f(., .) is increasing in both arguments, concave in et, with limi→∞
{
∂f(et,it)
∂it
}
=
0 for all et. For ease of notation, I assume that each user can access the market for
tokens only once in every period.16 This implies that those who use the protocol to
purchase goods and services in period t have a demand for tokens in period t equal
to Vt
pt
. Instead, those who use the protocol to sell goods or services have a supply of
tokens in period t+ 1 equal to Vt
pt
.17
The key assumption is that the value of the protocol is increasing in the sequence
of effort and investment. The developer’s effort and investment improve the pro-
tocol, in the sense of reducing transaction costs, increasing ease of use, increasing
security and reliability. As a consequence, more users (both on the selling side and
on the buying side) will use the protocol to perform more/larger transactions. Also,
although quite general, the above specification abstracts away from a possible coor-
dination problem in the adoption phase of the protocol. That is, because of network
externalities, it is possible that for given sequence of effort and investment there
are both a “high adoption” equilibrium in which the value of the protocol is high,
and a “low adoption” equilibrium in which the value of the protocol is low. With a
minimal loss of generality, the reader can interpret Vt as the value of the protocol
in one of these equilibria, the one that the developer expects to emerge.18
16 That is, the velocity of the token is 1. Assuming a different velocity will would introduce an
additional parameter that is, however, inconsequential with respect to subsequent derivations.
17 I’m abstracting away from the fact that, from period t point of view, the price in period t+ 1
may be uncertain, which may affect the willingness to trade using the protocol and the value of the
protocol. Introducing this additional complication does not change the equilibrium of the game.
I will argue later that, because no development occurs past period T , the price of the token is
constant from T onward. Furthermore, the value of the protocol from T onward must be larger
than the value of the protocol in any previous period. In equilibrium, because of the investors, the
price of the token in every period before T is equal (in expected terms) to the price of the token
at T , which implies that only the value of the protocol in period T matters in equilibrium. This
remains true when uncertainty depresses the value of the protocol in periods before T .
18 The loss of generality is that either the “high” or the ”low“ adoption equilibrium may not
exist for some levels of efforts and investments, generating a discontinuity in the way effort and
investment maps into the value of the protocol.
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The developer. Call Qt ≤ M the stock of tokens held by the developer at the
beginning of period t, with Q1 = M . Call
At ≡ a+
t−1∑
s=1
[(Qs −Qs+1) · ps − is] = At−1 − it−1 + pt−1(Qt−1 −Qt)
the total resources available to the developer at the beginning of period t, where a
are the developer’s initial assets (cash) and the rest are resources earned from the
sale of tokens in previous periods, net of the investments made. To account for the
fact that during periods t < to the developer cannot sell tokens, I impose that pt ≡ 0
for all t < to. Intuitively, in any t < to the developer cannot sell tokens but can
destroy them, which is equivalent to selling them at price zero. Of course, this will
not happen in equilibrium.
In every period, the developers maximizes assets at the end of life AT+1 minus
the disutility of effort. He faces a per-period feasibility constraint determining the
largest investment that can be made:
it ≤ At,
and a per-period cash constraint determining the maximum amount of tokens that
can be purchased by the developer
pt max {Qt+1 −Qt, 0} ≤ At − it.
Note that the cash constraint is always tighter than the feasibility constraint, which
can therefore be disregarded.
Similarly to investors, also the developer does not discount the future. Hence,
his problem can be rewritten in recursive form as, for t < T :
Ut(Qt, At) ≡ max
Qt,et,it
{
−1
2
e2t + Ut+1(Qt+1, At + (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it)+
λt(At − it − pt max {Qt+1 −Qt, 0})} ,
and for t = T :
UT (QT , AT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
AT +QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T + λT (AT − iT )
}
,
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t cash constraint.
The sequence of effort, investments and Qt are assumed observable by investors
and users at the beginning of each period. The developer understands the price
formation mechanism.
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3 Solution
3.1 Periods t ≥ T .
In this section I show that, given the set up of the model and an appropriate equilib-
rium selection criterion (which I introduce below), the price of the token in period
T is strictly increasing in the value of the protocol VT—and hence in the sequence
of effort and investments made by the developer. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that the solution to developer’s problem will depend exclusively on the
fact that pT is strictly increasing in VT , while the details of how VT affects pT will
be relevant only to derive closed-form solutions. That is, the model is robust to
different assumptions about what happens from period T onward (for example, re-
garding the demand and supply of tokens by users or by investors), provided that
under these different assumptions pT is increasing in VT .
The presence of investors and the fact that no development is possible after
period T implies that the price of the token must be constant from period T onward.
Investors are therefore indifferent between holding cash and holding the token, which
implies that there are multiple equilibria: the price of the token will depend on the
stock of tokens held by the investors, who are indifferent between holding any level
of tokens.
To break this indeterminacy I impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1. In equilibrium the stock of tokens held by investors from period
t ≥ T is γ ·M for γ ∈ [0, 1).
That is, out of the many equilibria possible, here I am interested in those in which
the demand for tokens by investors is a constant fraction of the stock of tokens M .
The term γ ·M therefore represents the “speculative” demand for tokens: the
demand for tokens driven by the expectation that future investors will also demand
γ ·M . Next to this demand, in every period there is a demand and a supply for
tokens originating from users. Because the stock of tokens available to users is
(1− γ) ·M , the price for token must solve:
pT =
VT
(1− γ)M .
The important observation here is that the price at which the developer can sell his
tokens in period T is strictly increasing in the value of the protocol VT , and therefore
in the prior sequence of effort and investments.
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3.2 The developer’s problem.
The fact that the price of the token in period T is increasing in the sequence of effort
and investments generates the following tension. Investors are forward looking and
are willing to purchase tokens in period t < T at the same price that is expected
in period T . But if the developer’s future effort is already priced into todays’ price,
the developer may be better off by selling all his tokens—that is, to benefit from
his future effort and investment before exerting any. This section shows that, as a
consequence of this tension, in every post-ICO period the equilibrium must be in
mixed strategy, in which, in every period with some probability the developer sells
all his tokens.
In solving for the developer’s problem, the following observation will play a key
role. Because investors are price takers, in every t > to their demand for tokens
depends exclusively on pt and p¯t (the largest future price) and not on the quantity
of tokens sold by the developer in period t.19 In particular, if pt = p¯t, then investors
are indifferent between purchasing any amount of tokens. At the same time, the
equilibrium price in period t should reflect effort and investments made prior to t.
Hence, because the instantaneous demand for tokens by investors is inelastic to the
supply of tokens, in every period the developer can sell any amount of tokens at the
market price. But because prices react to effort and investment which depend on
the stock of tokens held by the developer, the amount sold by the developer in each
period will have an effect on future prices.
It is useful to solve the developer’s problem by distinguishing two cases. The first
is the “rich developer” case, in which the developer’s initial assets a are sufficient
to cover the optimal level of investment in every period. In this case, the cash
constraint is never binding and can be ignored. The second case is that of a “poor
developer” in which the cash constraint is binding for at least one period.
3.2.1 Rich developer.
If the cash constraint is never binding, the developer’s utility can be written as, for
t ≤ T − 1:
U˜t(Qt) ≡ max
Qt+1,et,it
{
(Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it − 1
2
e2t + U˜t+1(Qt+1)
}
,
19 Of course, the equilibrium price will be such that demand equals supply; the point here is
simply that in a price-taking environment the demand cannot be a function of the supply.
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and for t = T :
U˜T (QT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T
}
.
Note that (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it is the cash generated in period t, net of investment.
Because there is no discounting and the cash constraint is never binding, I can
include this cash in period-t utility function (i.e., the period in which it is generated)
even if it is consumed in period T .
Consider the last period of the developer’s life. The fact that pT increases in eT
and iT immediately implies that U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex. The argument is quite
standard: if eT and iT were fixed, then pT would be fixed and U˜T (QT ) would be
linear in QT . However, the optimal eT and iT are20
e∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxe
{
f(e, i∗(QT ))
QT
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
(2)
i∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxi
{
f(e∗(QT ), i)
QT
(1− γ)M − i
}
(3)
As long as either e∗(QT ) or i∗(QT ) are positive for some QT ≤M (an assumption I
maintain to avoid trivialities), then optimal effort and investment react to changes
in QT , which implies that U˜T (QT ) must grow faster than linearly.
Consider now the choice of QT in period T − 1. For given eT−1 and iT−1, the
developer chooses QT so to maximize pT−1(QT−1 −QT ) + U˜T (QT ), which is strictly
convex in QT because U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex. It follows that, depending on pT−1,
the developer will either sell all his tokens (when pT−1 is high), or purchase as many
tokens as possible (when pT−1 is low), or be indifferent between these two options.
The price at which the developer is indifferent is
pT−1 =
U˜T (M)
M
=
VT−1 + f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M −
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
, (4)
where VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M is the period T price in case the developer holds M tokens
at the beginning of period T .
20 With a slight abuse of notation, I ignore the time index when writing optimal effort and optimal
investment. I show below that these functions are, in fact, time invariant. Note also that, under
the assumptions made on f(., .) optimal effort and investment must exist. They however may not
be unique. In what follows, for ease of exposition I implicitly assume that they are indeed unique,
although no result depends on this assumption.
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Note, however, that if investors expect the developer to sell all his tokens, they
should also expect no effort or investment in period T and therefore pT−1 should
be low. If instead they expect the developer to set QT = M , they should expect
maximum effort and investments in period T and therefore pT−1 should be high. We
therefore have an anti-coordination problem, which implies that the unique equilib-
rium is in mixed strategy: the price will be such that the developer is indifferent,
and the developer will randomize between QT = 0 and QT = M .
More precisely, if the developer sells all his tokens in period T −1, then the price
in period T will be VT−1
(1−γ)M . If instead the developer purchases M tokens in period
T − 1, then pT = VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M . Because investors must be indifferent between
purchasing in period T or period T − 1, it must be that
pT−1 =
VT−1
(1− γ)M + (1− αT−1)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all his tokens in period T − 1,
which using (4) can be written as
αT−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
For intuition, note that (e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M) is the cost generated by holding M
tokens, coming from the additional effort and investment that the developer will
exert in period T . Instead,
M · f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M ,
is the benefit of setting QT = M , coming from the increase in the value of these
tokens due to the developer’s effort and investment in period T . αT−1 is therefore
equal to the ratio between cost and benefit of holding M tokens in period T . Note
also that, because effort and investment are chosen optimally, the benefit should be
at least as large as the cost, and therefore αT−1 ≤ 1.
The following proposition shows that these results generalize to every period in
which the market for tokens operates.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium post-ICO). In every period t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}:
1. Optimal effort and investment for given Qt are e∗(Qt) and i∗(Qt), given by (2)
and (3).
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2. The developer sells all his tokens (so that Qt+1 = 0) with probability
αt =
1 if t = T(1− γ) (e∗(M))2/2+i∗(M)
f(e∗(M),i∗(M)) otherwise
(5)
and purchases all tokens (so that Qt+1 = M) with probability 1− αt.
3. The price of tokens as a function of past effort and investment is
pt =
Vt + (1− αt)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M . (6)
The proposition is based on the fact that all U˜t(Qt) are strictly convex and,
therefore, in every period t < T the equilibrium price must be such that the agent
is indifferent between holding all his tokens and selling all his tokens. But this also
implies that the agent is indifferent between selling all his tokens in period t or
holding M in every period until T . The benefit of exerting effort and of investing
in a given period is therefore given by the resulting change in pT , which is constant
over time and given by (2) and (3).
Hence, whenever Qt = M the value of the protocol increases by f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
in period t, while if Qt = 0 the value of the protocol does not change in period t. The
probability that Qt = 0 is such that investors are indifferent between holding the
token at t−1 or at t, and is also constant over time. It follows that the price in period
t (equation (6)) reflects past effort and past investment via the term Vt, as well as
expected future effort and investment via the term (1− αt)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M)).
This expression can also be interpreted as law of motion of the price, because it
implies that, in every period t ≤ T , the price of token will increase by
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
with probability
1− (1− γ) e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
and will decrease by
1
M
(
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
1− γ − (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M))
)
otherwise.
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Period to (the ICO) is characterize by the fact that tokens are sold via an auction.
Hence, contrarily to all subsequent periods, in period to the price of token depends
on the number of tokens sold, which is M − Qto . Again, in equilibrium investors
must be indifferent and therefore, for any number of tokens sold at ICO, it must be
that pto = pto+1. Hence, whenever to < T , the developer’s problem at ICO can be
written as
max
Qto+1
{
U˜to+1(Qto+1) + (M −Qto+1)pto
}
=
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}
+ (M −Qto+1)pto+1
}
≤
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1 + (M −Qto+1)pto+1
}}
=
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
M · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}
= U˜to+1(M)
where the first and the last equality follow from writing U˜to+1(Qto+1) explicitly (under
the assumption that the developer sells all his tokens in period to+1). The developer
therefore anticipates that the price of tokens will be the same at ICO and in the
following period, independently from how many token he sells. The number of token
sold, however, determine the equilibrium level of effort and investment in period to+1.
By choosing Qto+1 = M , the developer maximizes effort and investments in period
to+1, and therefore the price in period to+1. If instead to = T , then the developer sells
all his tokens during the ICO, and then exists the game. The following proposition
summarizes these observations.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium at to). If the ICO occurs before T , then the developer
does not sell any token at ICO. It follows that Qto+1 = M with probability 1. Effort
and investment in all to + 1 are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1. If instead the
ICO occurs at period T , then the developer sells all his tokens at ICO.
Proof. In the text.
Period to + 1 is therefore the only period in which the market is open and the
developer contributes to the development of the protocol with probability 1.
It is immediate to check that optimal effort and investment between period 1 and
to+1 are, again, e∗(M) and i∗(M). In all subsequent periods, instead, the existence
of the market for tokens creates a commitment problem: the value of the protocol is
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maximized when the developer holds all his tokens until T , but this cannot happen
in equilibrium. From period to+2 onward the developer exerts effort and invests with
probability less than one, which implies the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium to). The developer holds the ICO either in period T
or in period T − 1.
Proof. In the text.
Note that if the ICO is held in period T − 1 the developer will auction off 0
tokens, and he will sell M tokens on the market in period T . If instead the ICO
is in period T the developer sells all his tokens via the auction. Holding the ICO
in period T − 1 or period T , therefore, achieves the same outcome: the developer
does not sell any token before period T and sells all his tokens in period T . As a
consequence effort and investment are at their optimal level e∗(M) and i∗(M) with
probability 1 in every period.
Corollary 1. The cash constraint is never binding (and hence we are in the “rich
developer” case) if and only if a ≥ T · i∗(M).
Proof. Immediate from the above Proposition.
That is, we are in the “rich developer” case whenever the developer does not need
to sell tokens to finance the optimal amount of investment.
Finally, it is easy to check that the developers’ utility does not depend on M .
From (2) and (3) we know that the equilibrium sequence of investment and effort
is also independent from M . By proposition 1, in every post-ICO period the value
of all outstanding tokens ptM is independent from M . The developer’s utility is
therefore independent from M .
3.2.2 Poor developer
The rich developer case focuses on one side of seignorage: the incentives provided
to the developer. It shows that the developer will hold the ICO just before exiting
the game, as a way to commit to the optimal level of effort and investment in every
period.
There is, however, a second side of seignorage: its ability to channel funds from
investors to the developer, to be then used in the development of the protocol. I
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now introduce this aspect into the model by assuming that the developer is “poor”,
in the sense that a < T · i∗(M): the developer cannot invest efficiently in all periods,
and the cash constraint could be binding.
To focus on the role of the cash constraint, I assume the following functional
form
f(e, i) ≡ g(e)1{i ≥ i}, (A1)
where 1{} is the indicator function, and g(e) is strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave. Hence, i is an essential input in the development of the protocol, because
effort is productive only if i ≥ i. However, investing more that i is also not produc-
tive. The choice of optimal investment therefore simplifies to the choice between
two levels: i and 0.
Given this, period-T effort and investment are
eˆT (QT , iT ) ≡
e∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxe
{
g(e) QT
(1−γ)M − 12e2
}
if iT ≥ i
0 otherwise
(7)
iˆT (QT , AT ) ≡
i if i ≤ maxe
{
g(e) QT
(1−γ)M − 12e2
}
and i ≤ AT
0 otherwise
(8)
To avoid trivial equilibria in which there is never any effort or investment, I
furthermore assume that
i < maxe
{
g(e)
1
1− γ −
1
2
e2
}
(A2)
that is: there is a level of QT for which the developer will invest and exert posi-
tive effort whenever his assets are sufficient to do so. I call the threshold level Qˆ,
implicitly defined as
Qˆ ≡ Q : i = maxe
{
g(e)
Q
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
. (9)
In the remainder of this section, I fully solve for the equilibrium in periods T and
T − 1 depending on whether the ICO happened in period T , T − 1, or any earlier
period. I will only informally discuss the equilibrium in periods before T − 1. I will,
nonetheless, provide a characterization of the optimal timing of the ICO.
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Case 1: to = T . If the ICO occurs in the last period, then optimal effort and
investment in period T are given by (7) and (8). The price of a token is therefore:
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if AT < ig(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M otherwise
In period T − 1, the choice of optimal investment affects AT and the period-T
optimal effort and investment. This is relevant whenever i ≤ AT−1 < 2i, that is,
whenever assets in period T − 1 are not sufficient to invest optimally in both period
T − 1 and period T . It is quite immediate to see that, in this case, the final price is
always VT−2+g(e
∗(M))
(1−γ)M , independently from whether effort and investment are positive
in period T − 1 or T . The same logic applies to the choice of investment and effort
in any earlier period.Define
n ≡ argmaxk∈{1,2,...,T}{k · i ≤ a} (10)
as the number of periods in which the developer can invest efficiently using exclu-
sively his initial assets. The above discussion implies that the developer will invest
and exert effort for n periods, and he is indifferent with respect to which ones. The
following Proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 4 (ICO in period T ). Whenever to = T , the final value of the protocol
is VT = n · e∗(M).
Proof. In the text.
Case 2: to = T − 1. If the ICO occurs in period T − 1, then the developer can
finance some of its period T investment by selling tokens in period T−1. Remember
that, in equilibrium, the price of tokens at ICO pT−1 must be equal to pT . Hence,
for given M −QT (i.e., tokens sold at ICO) the price for tokens will be
pT =
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if AT−1 − iT−1 + pT (M −QT ) < ig(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M otherwise
(11)
Whenever AT−1 − iT−1 < i (that is, whenever the developer does not have enough
own funds to invest in period T ), both LHS and RHS of (11) depend on pT , and
therefore for given QT there are multiple equilibrium pT . For intuition, suppose
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that the developer announces the sale of M −QT tokens at ICO. If investors expect
pT to be low, they will drive down pT−1 (the price at ICO), which implies that the
level of investment achievable in period T by selling M −QT at ICO may be below
i, which justifies the initial expectation. If instead investors expect pT to be high,
in equilibrium pT−1 will also be high, which implies that the level of investment
achievable in period T by selling M − QT tokens at ICO may be above i, which
justifies the initial expectation. This can be interpreted as a coordination problem
among investors. For any number of tokens sold by the developer at ICO, investors
may coordinate on a “high” equilibrium that leads to high effort and investment in
period T , or on a “low” equilibrium leading to “low” (or no) development in period
T . Call p(QT ) the correspondence mapping QT to the equilibrium pT . We therefore
have (see also Figure 3):
p(QT ) =

VT−1
(1−γ)M if
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT <
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M if
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT >
VT−1
(1−γ)M{
VT−1
(1−γ)M ,
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
}
otherwise
QT
VT−1
(1−γ)M
Qˆ M
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT
Fig. 3: p(QT ) whenever i+ iT−1 > AT−1.
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The choice of QT maximizes the period-T utility UT (QT , AT ),. The next lemma
shows that UT (QT , AT ) is convex in QT , provided that the developer has enough
wealth to invest, and provided that he has enough “skin in the game” in the sense
of QT > Qˆ.
Lemma 1. UT (QT , AT ) is strictly convex in QT whenever i ≤ AT and QT ≥ Qˆ, and
is otherwise linear in QT . UT (QT , AT ) is linearly increasing in AT with slope 1 (cor-
responding to the marginal utility of consumption), and has an upward discontinuity
at AT = i if and only if QT ≥ Qˆ.
Proof. By the same argument made in the previous case: UT (QT , AT ) is linear in QT
whenever optimal investment and effort do not change with QT , and is strictly con-
vex whenever optimal investment and effort depend on QT . Similarly, UT (QT , AT )
is discontinuous in AT whenever the level of wealth allows for the optimal level of
investment.
Note, however, that
AT = AT−1 + (M −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1
where pT−1 is the price of tokens at ICO, and must be such that pT−1 ∈ p(QT ),
depending on which equilibrium is expected to emerge in period 3. Hence, the
choice of QT determines both period T ’s incentives to exert effort and whether the
developer will have enough resources to invest. The next lemma shows that the
continuation value is maximized at
Q∗T = M −
max{iT−1 + i− AT−1, 0}
pT−1
, (12)
which is the largest QT such that the developer can invest i in period T .
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium in period T − 1 for to = T − 1). If Q∗T > Qˆ the developer
chooses QT = Q∗T ; there are positive investment and effort in period T . If instead
Q∗T ≤ Qˆ then the developer is indifferent between any QT , and there are no invest-
ment nor effort in period T . When AT−1 − iT−1 < i¯ multiple equilibria are possible
and Q∗T may not be unique. When AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i¯ the equilibrium is unique and
Q∗T = M .
For intuition, remember that the developer has incentives to invest and exert
effort in period T only if QT > Qˆ. Whether QT > Qˆ is attainable depends on the
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cash constraint. If this constraint is tight, Q∗T ≤ Qˆ and no level of QT that allows
for positive investment will generate sufficient incentives and hence there will be no
development in period T . If instead the cash constraint is sufficiently loose, then
Q∗T > Qˆ and for some level of QT there will be positive effort and investment in
period T .
In this last case, multiple equilibria are possible. That is because the right
hand side of (12) may be neither monotonic nor continuous (remember that pT−1 ∈
p(QT )). That is, even assuming that the investors can solve their coordination
problem and therefore p(QT ) is a function and not a correspondence, there is an
additional coordination problem between developer and investors giving rise to mul-
tiple equilibrium Q∗T . Suppose that AT−1 − iT−1 < i, so that the developer needs
to sell some tokens at ICO in order to finance future development. If the price in
period T is expected to be high, so will be price in period T − 1 and, as a conse-
quence, the developer needs to sell fewer tokens in order to achieve iT = i. Because
he can hold a large fraction of tokens, future effort will be high, which implies that
today’s price for token should be large. Similarly, if period-T price is expected to
be low, price at ICO will be low, and the developer needs to sell a large fraction of
his tokens, which implies that future effort will be low, and so is today’s price. If
instead AT−1−iT−1 ≥ i then the developer does not need to sell any token to finance
his future investment and, as a consequence, in the unique equilibrium Q∗T = M .
Consider now optimal investment and effort in period T−1. It is easy to see that
optimal effort is again given by (7). The choice of optimal investment, instead, has
an inter-temporal element to consider: for given initial assets, the choice of period
T − 1 investment affects the equilibrium at ICO and therefore Q∗T . This is relevant
whenever AT−1 < 2i, in which case the developer may choose not to invest in period
T − 1, so to set Q∗T = M .
It is, however, easy to show that postponing investment is never optimal. Sup-
pose that the developer has sufficient funds to invest only in one period. If the
developer invests in period T − 1, then total utility is
VT−2 + g∗(M) + g∗(Q∗T )
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(M))2 − 1
2
(e∗(g∗(Q∗T ))
2.
if instead the developer does not invest in T − 1, he can set QT = M and achieve
utility
VT−2 + g∗(M)
(1− γ)M M − (e
∗(M))2.
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Comparing the above two expressions, it is clear that the developer is better off
by using his own funds for investing in period T − 1, and then financing period-T
investment via the sale of tokens at ICO. This reasoning extends to any period prior
to the ICO, and therefore implies the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (ICO in period 2). Whenever to = T − 1, the final value of the
protocol is
VT =
3g∗(M) if a ≥ 3ing∗(M) + g∗(Q∗T ) otherwise
where n is defined in (10) and Q∗T is defined in (12).
Proof. In the text.
Corollary 2. The developer prefers to hold the ICO in period T − 1 than in period
T , strictly so when AT−1 < 2i.
Whenever AT−1 > 2i the developer has sufficient funds to invest in the last 2
periods. This is the “rich developer” case discussed above, and the developer is
indifferent between holding the ICO in period T − 1 or T , because in either case he
will sell all tokens in period T . If instead AT−1 < 2i, then the developer is better
off by using his funds to invest in periods T − 1, raise funds at ICO, and then use
these funds to invest in period T .
Case 3: to < T −1. If the ICO occurred in period to < T −1, then in period T −1
there is a market for tokens. Let’s start by considering the choice of QT , that is, of
how many tokens to sell or buy on the market in period T − 1. For given market
price pT−1, the developer’s utility as a function of QT is:
UT (QT , AT−1+(QT−1 −QT )·pT−1−iT−1)+λT−1(AT−1−iT−1−pT−1 max {QT −QT−1, 0})
There are similarities with the previous case (i.e., the case of an ICO in period
T − 1). Also here the choice of QT determines the assets available in the following
period. As a consequence, the continuation value
UT (QT , AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1)
is strictly convex in QT only for
Qˆ ≤ QT ≤ Q∗T
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and is linearly increasing in QT otherwise, with a downward discontinuity at Q∗T
(where Q∗T is defined in (12)).
There are however two important differences with the previous case. The first
one is that, here, the developer could have sold some tokens during a previous period,
and therefore it is possible that QT−1 < M . It follows that the cash constraint in
period T − 1 may be binding. With this respect, note that if the cash constraint in
period T −1 is binding, then AT = 0 and the cash constraint in period T is binding.
Conversely, if the period T cash constraint is binding we have AT = i, which implies
that the period T − 1 cash constraint is not binding. Hence, in solving for QT ,
the only constraint that needs to be taken into consideration is the period-T cash
constraint.
Second, and most importantly, because investors are price takers, then the mar-
ket price in period T − 1 does not depend on QT . Only period-T price depends on
QT , leading to the same type of anti-coordination problem discussed in the “rich
developer” case.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium in period T − 1 for to < T − 1). If Q∗T ≤ Qˆ, then the
developer is indifferent between holding any level of QT . Effort and investment in
period T are zero, so that pT = pT−1 =
VT−1
(1−γ)M .
If instead Q∗T > Qˆ, then, in equilibrium, the developer is indifferent between
setting QT = 0 and setting QT = Q∗T . He sets QT = 0 with probability
αT−1 =
(
1
2
(e∗(Q∗T )
2 + i
)(
Q∗T ·
g(e∗(Q∗T )
(1− γ)M
)−1
The equilibrium price is
pT−1 =
VT−1 + (1− αT−1)g(e∗(Q∗T ))
(1− γ)M
If AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i multiple equilibria are possible, while if AT−1 − iT−1 > i the
equilibrium is always unique.
By comparing the above lemma with Lemma 2, we can see the difference between
selling tokens in period T − 1 via an ICO or on the market. The difference is
that, whenever Q∗ > Qˆ, if the market for tokens exists the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies, while if the tokens are sold via an ICO the equilibrium is in pure strategies.
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The reason is that the presence of the market generates the same anti-coordination
problem discussed in the previous section. The developer randomizes between sell-
ing everything and setting QT = 0 and holding the maximum number of tokens,
which is the minimum between the one at which period-T cash constraint is binding
and M .
The other features of the equilibrium are similar. In particular, whenever AT−1−
iT−1 ≤ i there could be multiple equilibria. There could be an equilibrium in which
pT−1 is high, which implies that the developer needs to sell few tokens to finance
future investment, and therefore period-T effort is high. Next to this equilibrium,
there could be one in which pT−1 is low, which implies that the developer needs to
sell many tokens to finance future investment, and therefore period-T effort is low.
If instead AT−1 − iT−1 > i then the developer does not need to sell any token to
achieve iT = i, and this coordination problem is absent. In case the market for
tokens is open, there are therefore multiple mixed strategy equilibria, each of them
corresponding to a different Q∗T and a different pT−1.
For example, the choice of iT−1 affects Q∗T . Hence, the developer may want to
set iT−1 = 0 even if AT−1 ≥ i and QT−1 > Qˆ so to achieve a higher Q∗T . Not only,
but because there are multiple equilibrium Q∗T , the choice of iT−1 may determine
what equilibrium emerges in the market for tokens. This difficulty extends to the
choice of QT−2, because QT−2 determines iT−1.
Despite these issues, it is possible to characterize the developer’s choice of when
to hold an ICO. The reason is that every time the market is open, there is the basic
anti-coordination problem discussed earlier and the equilibrium is in mixed strategy.
If instead the developer does not hold the ICO and has sufficient funds to invest
i¯, he will set the optimal level of effort and investments with probability 1. This
observation implies the following proposition.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium to = n, that is, the developer initially invests using
his own funds, and holds the ICO as soon as his funds are below i¯.
Proof. In the text.
To conclude, note that, also here, the developer’s payoff does not depend on M .
The reason is that, in each period, the developer’s problem depends on M only via
the share of M that he holds (see the optimal level of effort (2) and the incentive
to set positive investment (9)). Therefore, in each period, the value of the protocol
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and the value of all outstanding tokens ptM depend on the share of tokens held by
the developer in each period and not on M . In addition, in all cases analyzed, the
equilibrium share of tokens held by the developer in a given period is either zero,
M or Q∗T . It is easy to see that, if ptM is independent from M , so is Q∗T/M , and
therefore equilibrium the share of tokens held by the developer in each period is also
independent from M .
4 First best
In the first best, effort and investment are set so to maximize the present discounted
value of the surplus generated by the protocol.21 Furthermore, the ICO is held
immediately so to allow users to use the protocol from the very beginning.
The equilibrium of the game differs from the first best in several ways. As
already discussed, in equilibrium the developer will want to hold the ICO only after
exhausting his own funds. This is, however, inefficient because users are prevented
from using the protocol before the ICO. The equilibrium post ICO is also inefficient
because the developer may set zero effort and zero investment even if the social
value of his effort and investment is strictly positive.
More interestingly, even assuming that the market for tokens exists so that users
can use the protocol and that the developer will set positive effort and investment,
there is an additional source of inefficiency. The developer is setting effort and
investment so to maximize the value of the protocol in period T , when he will exit
the game. A minor observation is that the value of the protocol in a given period
(i.e., the value of the transactions that occur using the protocol) is, in general,
different from the social surplus generated by the protocol.22 A more important
observation is that, in its objective function, the developer completely disregards
the fact that the protocol will generate value over multiple periods, focusing instead
exclusively on the period in which he will sell all his tokens and exit the game.
Whether the developer’s effort and investment will be above or below their first
best level is, however, unclear and depends on γ, which determines the elasticity of
the price of token to his effort and investment. If the speculative demand for tokens
is sufficiently high, then the developer will exert effort and investment above the
21 The discount factor should be that of users.
22 The social surplus depends on the equilibrium utility/profits of users on the buying and selling
side of the protocol, as well as on their outside options.
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first best. If instead it is low, then the developer may exert effort and invest below
the first best.
5 Discussion
5.1 Seignorage vs monopoly pricing
The discussion of the first best is also relevant when comparing seignorage with more
standard mechanism such as establishing a set of fees/prices for using the protocol.
Profits generated via seignorage depend on the value of the protocol in the moment
in which the developer sells his tokens. Under standard monopoly pricing, instead,
the monopolist is able, in every period, to capture only a fraction of the value of
the protocol (which will depend on the elasticity of supply and demand). But the
monopolist is able to earn profits in every period, not only in one period.
Profits under seignorage therefore depend on the value of the protocol in a given
period, while profits under standard monopoly pricing will accrue in every period.
Which one is larger is, however, ambiguous and depend crucially on γ: the specu-
lative demand for tokens. It is always possible to find a large enough γ such that
profits under seignorage are greater than profits under monopoly pricing. For low
γ, however, the ranking may reverse.
5.2 Asymmetric information
The results derived above largely extend to a situation in which the developer’s
productivity is private information. In this case, if the market for token is open, for
given price for token there is a threshold productivity above which the developer
wants to hold all tokens, below which the developer wants to sell all tokens. The
price in every period is equal to the expected price tomorrow, which depends on the
developer’s expected contribution to the protocol. In every period, if the developer
is more productive that the market expectation he will purchase tokens and develop
the protocol with probability 1. If the developer is less productive than the market
expectation he will sell all tokens and not develop the protocol.23
23 The same argument can be made about wealth. If the developer’s wealth is private information
and affects the development of the protocol, then a developer who is richer than the market
expectation about his wealth will want to purchase all tokens and develop with probability one.
Otherwise he will sell all tokens and not develop.
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The important observation is that, if at ICO the productivity of the developer is
unknown to investors, it will nonetheless be revealed over time. In the moment it is
fully revealed, the equilibrium of the game is again the one derived in the previous
section. Asymmetry of information therefore implies that developers with above
average productivity may contribute to the development of the protocol with prob-
ability 1 for some periods. Conversely, developers with below average productivity
do not contribute to the protocols initially. After the developer’s productivity is
revealed, he will contribute with probability less than 1 as in the symmetric infor-
mation case.
Less obvious is the impact of asymmetric information on the timing of the ICO.
A developer of ability greater than the investors’ expectation may benefit from an-
ticipating the ICO, because he expects to exert effort and invest in the development
of the protocol with probability 1 for few post-ICO periods. But if this is the case,
then investors should infer that a developer holding an ICO early is of high ability.
This, clearly, cannot be an equilibrium because, now, the high-ability developer does
not benefit anymore from anticipating the ICO. The full analysis of this problem is
left for future work.
5.3 Multiple, heterogeneous developers
Suppose that there is a population of developers indexed by j, each characterized
by a productivity parameter qjt (commonly known) so that effort and investment by
developer j in period t generates an increase in the value of the protocol equal to
qjt f(e
j
t , i
j
t). If all developers are “ ‘rich” (that is, the cash constraint is never binding
for any developer), in every period t the equilibrium price of the token must be such
that the developer with the largest qit+1 is indifferent between holding all tokens
or no tokens.24 If, furthermore, maxj qjt is constant over time, then the model is
formally identical to the one just solved. The only difference is its interpretation: in
every period a different developer (the most productive in that period) may purchase
tokens and contribute to the development of the protocol.
Contrary to the case considered in the body of the text, now the existence of a
24 Suppose not. Then the best developer strictly prefers to hold all tokens and exert the maximum
level of effort and investment in the following period. But then this developer’s contribution to the
protocol should already be accounted for in the current price, which implies that this developer
strictly prefers to sell all his token, leading to a contradiction.
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market for tokens generates an allocative efficiency: the most productive developer
works on the project in every period. Of course, as we already saw, this developer
contributes to the project only with some probability. It follows that holding an
ICO has an additional benefit because it allows the most productive developer to
contribute to the project in every period. Absent the ICO, instead, the initial
developer will set high effort and investment in every period, but he may not be the
most productive developer who could work on the project.
If instead some developer are “poor” (i.e., the cash constraint may be binding),
then the most productive developer in a given period may not have enough resources
to purchase tokens and/or invest efficiently in the development of the protocol. The
developer that, in equilibrium, develops the protocol with positive probability in
every period depends partly on productivity and partly on wealth.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies a novel form of financing for open-source software development:
seignorage. I show that seignorage is effective at generating incentives and providing
financial resources for the development of blockchain-based software. Its effective-
ness is, however, limited by the fact that whenever a market for tokens exists, in
equilibrium there is a positive probability that the developer will sell all his tokens
and that, as a consequence, no development will occur.
Importantly, in the “rich developer” case the developer uses his own resources to
finance the investment in the protocol, so that seignorage plays a role exclusively
because it generates profits and provides incentives. In the “poor developer” case,
seignorage has the additional role of providing resources to be invested into the
development of the protocol. The comparison between the two cases shows that
the use of seignorage to finance the investment in the protocol is a second-best re-
sponse to the developer’s lack of resource, because the value of the protocol (and
the developer’s payoff) is always higher in the “rich developer” case. This observa-
tion suggests that an external investor (call it a traditional investor) could provide
capital to the developer so to move from the “poor developer” to the “rich developer”
case, and by doing so generate extra surplus. This, however, would depend crucially
on the ability of the traditional investor and the developer to contract. Studying the
constraints that, in this environment, prevent perfect contracting between a tradi-
tional investor and a developer, and establishing whether seignorage and traditional
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financing are complements or substitutes is left for future work.
Finally, the model abstracts away from competition, either from other open-
source blockchain-based protocols or traditional companies. One interesting aspect
of competition is how it changes the timing of the ICO. In particular, if there are
“winner takes all” dynamics and network effects, it is conceivable that the developer
will want to anticipate the ICO, so to build a sufficiently large user base and prevent
the entrance of competitors. But competition is likely to affect the equilibrium of
the game in many other ways. The full treatment of this case is also left for future
work.
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Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In the text I show that if U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex and
therefore, in equilibrium, in period T −1 the developer is indifferent between selling
all his tokens or keeping all his tokens. It follows that I can write
U˜T−1(QT−1) = max
eT−1,iT−1,eT ,iT
{
−iT−1 − e
2
T−1
2
− iT − e
2
T
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
,
that is, I can write the utility in period T − 1 assuming that the developer sells
all his tokens in period T . Again, because effort and investment affect pT , then
U˜T−1(QT−1) is strictly convex and, in equilibrium, in period T − 2 the developer is
indifferent between selling all his tokens or keeping all his tokens. Therefore I can
write
U˜T−2(QT−2) = max
eT−2,iT−2,eT−1,iT−1,eT ,iT
{
−iT−2 − e
2
T−2
2
− iT−1 − e
2
T−1
2
− iT − e
2
T
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
which is strictly convex. Repeating the same argument implies that all U˜t(Qt) are
strictly convex, that in every period the only possible equilibrium is one in which
the developer is indifferent between selling all his tokens or purchasing all tokens,
and that all U˜t(Qt) can be written as
U˜t(Qt) = max
et,it,et+1,it+1,...,eT ,iT
{
−
∑
s
= tT is −
∑
s
= tT
e2s
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
.
This implies that, in every period, optimal effort and investment are again given by
(2) and (3).
Furthermore, for the agent to be indifferent, in every period the price must be
pt =
U˜t+1(M)
M
. Writing the utility function in period t+1 as above, and using optimal
effort and investment, we get
pt =
Vt + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
(13)
It follows that if Qt = M , then
pt =
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
if instead Qt = 0, then
pt =
Vt−1 + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
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Call αt−1 the probability that in period t − 1 the developer sells all his tokens.
Because investors must be willing to hold tokens between the two periods, it must
be that
pt−1 =
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t+ 1)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
=
αt−1
(
Vt−1 + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
)
+
(1− αt−1)
(
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
)
Solving for αt−1 yields:
αt−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
Finally, the above expression can be used to further simplify (13) and achieve (6)
Proof of Lemma 2. As discussed in the text, the choice of QT maximizes the con-
tinuation value:
UT (QT , AT−1 + (M −QT ) · p∗T − iT−1),
where p∗T ∈ p(QT ) depends on which equilibrium is expected to emerge in period
T. The important observation is that QT determines the assets available in the
following period. Therefore, by Lemma 1, the continuation value is strictly convex
in QT for
Qˆ ≤ QT ≤ QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1
pT
and is linearly increasing in QT otherwise, with a downward discontinuity at M −
iT−1+i−AT−1
pT
, given by the minimum number of tokens that the developer needs to
sell in order to achieve i in period T. See Figure 4 for a graphical representation.
Suppose that the “high” equilibrium is expected to emerge, so that pT = max{p(QT )}.
The discontinuity is at
Q˜′T ≡ QT :
i+ iT−1 − AT−1
M −QT =
VT−1 + g(e∗(QT ))
(1− γ)M
generating a continuation utility:
VT−1 + g(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))2
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QT
UT (QT , AT−1 + (M −QT ) · pT − iT−1)
M − iT−1+i−AT−1
pTQˆ M
Fig. 4: Continuation value as a function of QT .
If the “low” equilibrium is expected to emerge, then the discontinuity is at
Q˜′′T = M −
(
i+ iT−1 − AT−1
)
(1− γ)M
f(eT−2, iT−2) + f(eT−1, iT−1)
generating a continuation utility:
VT−1 + g(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))2
Because period T effort is chosen optimally, it must be that
g(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M ≥
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))2
and
g(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M ≥
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))2
which implies that the two continuation utilities (the one with threshold Q˜′T and the
one with threshold Q˜′′T ) are greater than the continuation utility when the developer
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holds QT = M and no investment occurs:
f(eT−2, iT−2) + f(eT−1, iT−1)
(1− γ)M M
Hence holding either Q˜′T or Qˆ′′T is preferred to holding the entire stock of tokens M
and not investing. The continuation utility is therefore maximized at either Q˜′T or
Qˆ′′T , depending on what equilibrium is expected to emerge in period T .
Proof of Lemma 3. Remember that Q∗T is the largest possible QT such that the
period-T constraint is not binding. It follows that, as already discussed, if Q∗T ≤ Qˆ
then the continuation value is linear in QT because there is no QT for which the
developer will exert effort in period T .
If instead Q∗T > Qˆ then the continuation value is somewhere strictly convex in QT
for QT ≤ Q∗T . In this case, there is the same anti-coordination problem discussed for
the “rich developer” case and the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The developer
must be indifferent between QT = 0 and Q∗T .
The price at which the developer is indifferent is:
pT−1 =
UT (Q
∗
T , AT−1 + (QT−1 −Q∗T ) · pT−1 − iT−1)
Q∗T
=
Q∗T
(
VT−1+g(e∗(Q∗T ,i)
(1−γ)M
)
− 12(e∗(Q∗T , i)2 − i
Q∗T
Furthermore, investors must be indifferent between holding tokens in period T
and in period T − 1, which implies that
pT−1 =
VT−1 + (1− αT−1)g(e∗(Q∗T , i))
(1− γ)M
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all his tokens in period T − 1.
Combining the above two expressions and solving for αT−1 yield the expression in
the proposition.
For existence and (sometimes) uniqueness of the equilibrium, without loss of gen-
erality, assume that whenever Q∗ ≤ Qˆ the agent randomizes between max{Q∗T ,M}
and 0. Define Q∗T as a function of pT−1 by:
Q(p) ≡
min
{
QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1p ,M
}
if QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1p > 0
0 otherwise,
which is increasing whenever AT−1− iT−1 ≤ i (that is, when the developer needs to
sell some tokens in period T − 1 to invest iT = i), and is decreasing otherwise.
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Similarly define the equilibrium pT−1 as a function of Q∗T by:
p(Q) ≡ VT−1 + (1− α(Q))g(e
∗(Q), i∗(Q,AT )){i∗(Q) ≥ i}
(1− γ)M
where
α(Q) ≡
(
1
2
(e∗(Q, i∗(Q,AT )))2 + i∗(Q,AT )
)(
Q · g(e
∗(Q, i∗(Q,AT )))
(1− γ)M
)−1
The complication here is that, for given Q, AT is itself a function of p(Q), which
implies that p(Q) is a correspondence. The reason is the same discussed in the body
of the paper for the case to = T − 1: if the developer needs to sell some tokens
to invest in period T , then for given number of tokens sold, period-T investment
will be a function of the price at which the developer can sell these tokens. Hence,
whenever AT−1− iT−1 < i (that is, whenever the developer needs to sell some tokens
in period T − 1 to invest iT = i), we have
p(Q) ≡ VT−1
(1− γ)M+

0 if either Q ≤ Qˆ or Q > QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M if Qˆ ≤ Q ≤ QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
because
QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
< QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
for all Q, the case AT−1 − iT−1 < i can be split into three subcases:25
1. (“high VT−1”) Whenever QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
> Qˆ then for some Q we have
p(Q) =
{
VT−1
(1−γ)M ,
VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
}
. That is, there are situations in which
for given Q∗T , if pT−1 is low the developer will not have enough funds to finance
investment in period T , and therefore no development will occur. If instead
pT−1 is high there is positive probability that the developer will invest and
exert effort in period T . Again, this situation can be seen as a coordination
problem among investors. For given action taken by the developer in period
T − 1, investors can coordinate on a “high” equilibrium that leads to effort
and investment in period T with positive probability, or a “low” equilibrium
leading to no development in period T .
25 The three cases emerge as a function of the three state variables QT−1, VT−1 and AT−1−iT−1.
For ease of exposition, I describe them solely in terms of VT−1, although for QT−1 > Qˆ but
sufficiently low, the three cases will indeed emerge as a function of VT−1 exclusively.
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2. (“low VT−1”) Whenever QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(M))g(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M
≤ Qˆ, then there is no de-
velopment in period T and p(Q) = VT−1
(1−γ)M for all Q.
3. (“intermediate VT−1”) in all other cases, p(Q) is a function, which is equal to
VT−1
(1−γ)M for Q ≤ Qˆ and to VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e
∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M otherwise.
Instead, whenever AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i (that is, whenever the developer has enough
own funds to invest iT = i), then period T investment does not depend on pT−1 and
therefore
p(Q) ≡ VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if either Q ≤ Qˆ(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M otherwise
which is a continuous function.
By definition of α(Q), I can write
Q · g(e
∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M −
1
2
(e∗(Q, i))2 − i = (1− α(Q))Q · g(e
∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M . (14)
The LHS of (14) is equal to:
max
e
{
Q · g(e, i)
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
which is strictly increasing and strictly convex in Q. It follows that the RHS of (14)
must also be strictly increasing and strictly convex in Q. This, in turn, implies that
p(Q) is strictly increasing whenever Q is such that positive development is expected
with some probability in period T , and is constant otherwise.
The equilibrium of the game is a p∗ such that p∗ = p(Q(p∗)) and a Q∗ = Q(p∗).
Figure 5 represents all possible cases. Whenever both p(Q) and Q(p) are functions,
the existence of the equilibrium is readily established. It is enough to note that
the range of p(Q) is a closed interval. Call this interval [a, b]. The equilibrium is
the fixed point of the continuous function p(Q(p)) defined over [a, b]. Brower’s fixed
point theorem applies and the fixed point exists.
Whenever p(Q) is a correspondence (AT−1− iT−1 < i, “high VT−1” case) we know
that for Qˆ ≤ Q ≤ QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
we have that VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e
∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M ∈
p(Q). Define the threshold value of Q
Q˜ ≡ QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1
VT−1+(1−α(Q˜))g(e∗(Q˜,i))
(1−γ)M
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and similarly the corresponding price
p˜ ≡ VT−1 + (1− α(Q˜))g(e
∗(Q˜, i))
(1− γ)M ∈ p(Q)
By definition of Q(p) we have that Q˜ = Q(p˜), which implies that {Q˜, p˜} is an
equilibrium.
It is quite immediate to see that in case AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i the equilibrium is
unique. The equilibrium is unique also in the “low VT−1” case. In all other cases
multiple equilibria are possible.
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p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
p∗ = VT−1
(1−γ)M p(Q)
(a) AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i; "low VT−1" case.
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
Q∗TQ
∗
T−2
iT−1+i−AT−1
Qˆ−QT−1
p∗T−2 =
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
p∗T−1
Q∗T−1
p∗T
(b) AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i; "intermediate VT−1" case; mul-
tiple equilibria
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
Q∗
iT−1+i−AT−1
Qˆ−QT−1
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
p∗
(c) AT−1 − iT−1 < i; "high VT−1" case.
p
Q
Qˆ M
Q∗
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
Q(p)
p∗
Q∗
(d) AT−1 − iT−1 > i
Fig. 5: Equilibrium in T − 1.
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